We know what the west wants from a resurgent China. We have a pretty good sense of what China doesn’t want from the west. What’s missing from this story of global geopolitical upheaval is a clear idea of what China wants from its rise to great power status.

　　我们很清楚西方希望从一个东山再起的中国身上得到些什么，也相当了解中国不希望从西方那里得到些什么。但在当前这场全球地缘政治巨变中，我们所不清楚的是，中国希望从崛起为世界强国的过程中得到些什么。

　　Like many European and American commentators I spend a fair amount of time listening to Chinese scholars, officials and diplomats. A few years ago such figures were a rare sighting on the international conference circuit. And visitors to Beijing were left feeling that their interlocutors had been carefully screened to admit only one view of the world.

　　与许多欧美评论人士一样，我花了大量时间倾听中国学者、官员和外交家的讲话。就在几年前，这些人物在国际会议圈中还是一道罕见的风景；而访问北京的人士都会有这样一种感觉，即与他们对话的人都是经过精心筛选的——这些人只认可一种世界观。

　　Not any more. Some months ago I listened to a Chinese vice minister casually acknowledge divisions at the illustrious Central Party School about relations with Washington. Some among the keepers of the ideological flame thought the US would only ever understand the currency of raw power; others that China’s self-interest still lay in co-operation as well as competition.

　　这种情况已一去不复返。几个月前，我听到中国一位副部长不经意间承认，大名鼎鼎的中央党校内部在中美关系问题上存在分歧：一些固守意识形态的人认为，美国从来都只认硬实力这种“通货”；也有人认为，为确保中国自身利益，仍需采取合作与竞争双管齐下的战略。

　　Chinese academics speak quite openly, albeit off-the-record, about the conflicting currents in Beijing – between nationalists and liberals, generals and party leaders. The implications of the coming generational change at the top of the party are keenly debated.

　　对于中央高层——民族主义者与自由主义者、军队将领与党内领导人之间——在思路上存在分歧一事，中国的学者们算得上是直言不讳，尽管他们只是在私下里发表言论。目前，各界正就即将到来的中共最高层换届会带来哪些影响进行着激烈辩论。

　　One leading scholar was heard to say recently that Hu Jintao, who steps down next year as China’s president, had been little more than a “petty bureaucrat”. The west was in for a surprise when the generation of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping took office. These young leaders had been shaped and hardened by Mao’s Cultural Revolution. They would not be shy of wielding power.

　　一位知名学者不久前说过，将于明年卸下国家主席一职的胡锦涛，在位时的表现与一位“谨小慎微的官僚”无异。当待任国家主席习近平等新一代领导人上台后，西方定会大吃一惊。毛泽东发动的文化大革命对这代年轻的领导人影响很大，磨练了他们的意志。他们将不惧运用权力。

　　Others are not so sure. One prominent (and very rich) business leader argues that the grinding process of getting to top in the Chinese system militates still against a radical break with the past. What’s clear from most such conversations, though, is that Deng Xaoping’s admonition that China should hide its strength is nowadays observed more in the breach than the observance. Talk that China wants to take back charge of its East Asian neighbourhood is no longer met with protestations about a misreading of more benign intentions.

　　其他人就不那么肯定了。一位著名（且极其富有）的商界领袖表示，爬到体制内的顶端意味着要被磨去棱角，这一过程仍可防止新领导层彻底抛弃以往的政策。不过，此类谈话大多表明了一点：人们如今认为，中国领导层对邓小平关于中国应韬光养晦的训诫，已是违背多于遵守。有关中国希望重新掌控东亚地区的言论，也不再遭到中方抗议、称之是对自己善意的一种误读。

　　The west, which, absent a coherent European policy towards the rising powers, mostly means the US and Japan, is pretty clear what it wants from the new China. It was summed up in the worn, but still useful, phrase coined by Robert Zoellick, when he called for Beijing to behave as a “responsible stakeholder”.

　　西方非常清楚自己希望从面貌一新的中国那里得到些什么——鉴于欧洲对新兴大国缺乏一致的政策，这里的西方主要指美国和日本。对于这一点，可以用罗伯特?佐利克(Robert Zoellick)创造的一个陈腐但仍然有用的说法来概括：他呼吁中国政府成为一个“负责任的利益攸关方”。

　　This sees China taking its place in defending and developing the rules-based global order. Beijing has a point when it protests this is a western construction. Yet the US can argue that it has provided the essential framework for China’s rise.

　　这将要求中国担负起自己的责任，捍卫并发展基于规则的全球秩序。中国政府抗议这是西方构筑的秩序——它这么说有一定道理。但美国可以主张，这一秩序为中国的崛起提供了不可或缺的框架。

　　On the other side of the fence, Chinese policymakers make few bones about what they don’t want from the west. Top of the list is any hint of a challenge to China’s territorial integrity. Support for more autonomy in Tibet or Xinjiang or for Taiwanese independence is a hostile act – an effort to foment the break-up of the Chinese state.

　　另一方面，中国政策制定者直言不讳地说出了他们不希望从西方得到些什么。中国最不想看到的是中国的领土完整受到任何挑战。任何支持西藏或新疆获得更多自治权、或支持台湾独立的行为，都被视为企图促成中国分裂的敌对行为。

　　Second on the don’t-want list is a confrontation that would disturb the course of China’s rising prosperity. As much as it is now more assertive than Mr Deng might have liked, Beijing is anxious to avoid any rupture abroad that might jeopardise growth and social order at home. China will retaliate against, say, US arms sales to Taiwan, but within carefully-calibrated bounds.

　　中国第二不想看到的，是会扰乱中国繁荣进程的对抗。鉴于目前中国已变得比邓小平可能希望见到的更加自信，中国政府急于避免任何可能危及国内增长和社会秩序的对外关系破裂。比方说，虽然中国将就美国对台军售报复美方，但报复措施都限定在经过仔细拿捏的范围内。

　　A third taboo is western lecturing about China’s political and social order. David Cameron was reminded of this this week when he received Wen Jiabao in 10 Downing Street. The British prime minister got a public dressing down from the Chinese premier. China had had enough of British “finger-pointing” about human rights.

　　第三个禁忌是西方对中国政治和社会秩序进行说教。英国首相戴维?卡梅伦(David Cameron)此次在唐宁街10号接见中国总理温家宝时，就受到了提醒。温家宝公开指责了卡梅伦的言论，暗示中国受够了英国在人权问题上指手划脚。

　　The snub was calculated. Accompanying officials let it be known that Mr Wen’s subsequent stopover in Berlin was much the more important leg of his European trip. This was partly, of course, because of the much more valuable trade and investment relationship between Germany and China. But Angela Merkel, it seems, is also careful to make rather less of a public fuss about dissidents.

　　这种冷落是精心设计的。随同出访的中国官员们放风说，温家宝的下一站访问地柏林，是他此次欧洲之旅中更加重要的一站。当然，这在一定程度上是因为中德之间的贸易和投资关系要重要得多。但另一个原因似乎是，德国总理安格拉?默克尔(Angela Merkel)小心翼翼地采取了一种不那么公开的方式，就中国异见人士问题向中方表达了不满。

　　Beijing does not want to see any extension of intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. If China joins in telling others how to behave, others will claim legitimacy in telling it how to behave. Liberal internationalism also makes it harder for Beijing to strike dodgy deals with dubious regimes producing vital natural resources.

　　中国政府不希望看到干涉主权国家事务的做法呈现扩大化。如果中国也像有关国家一样、开始对他国的行事方式指指点点，那么别的国家会认为自己也有理由告诉中国该如何行事。另外，自由国际主义也会让中国政府在与关键自然资源出产国的不可靠政权达成猫腻重重的协议时，面临更大的困难。

　　Chinese officials will agree there is sometimes a balance to be struck. Beijing has signed up to United Nations principles on the rights of citizens as well as states. But it will only go so far. Thus, while it allowed UN authorisation for intervention in Libya, Mr Wen insists the western military action was a mistake not to be repeated elsewhere.

　　中国官员认同一点，即有时需要取得某种平衡。中国政府已签署了《联合国公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，但也只会做到这一步了。因此，尽管它同意联合国授权对利比亚进行干预，但温家宝仍坚称，西方的军事行动是一个错误，不应在其它任何地区重演。

　　So far, so clear. It is when you ask about China’s ambitions for its place in the world that inscrutability sets in. Yes, China wants a role commensurate with its history as a great and ancient civilisation. Yes, its economic rise has greatly expanded its strategic interests. But does it want to shape a different international order? How far will it extend its military reach? Does it see its own political and economic model competing more widely with western liberal capitalism? These are questions that rarely elicit illuminating responses.

　　到此为止，情况已非常清楚。当你问及中国对于其国际地位的雄心时，很难得到一个明朗的答案。是的，中国希望自己的地位与它伟大而古老的文明相配，其经济腾飞也大大扩张了它的战略利益。但它希望塑造一个新的国际秩序吗？它将在多大程度上扩张其军事势力范围？它是否认为自己的政治经济模式正在与西方自由资本主义展开更广泛的竞争？这些问题很少引出有启发性的回答。

　　Inference provides some of the answers. The activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea and the present tilt of military spending point to the desire to push back US forces. A close alliance with Pakistan underlines the strategic weight given to safeguarding China’s supply lines to and from the oil-rich Gulf.

　　部分问题可通过推断得到答案。中国人民解放军近来在南海的活动，以及目前军费开支的加大，都表明中国渴望抵制美国的军事力量。与巴基斯坦的紧密联盟则突显出，中国把保卫本国与富产石油的海湾地区之间的双向供应线路视为战略重点。

　　A strategy of divide and rule suggests a conscious desire to capitalise on Europe’s present weakness and undercut the Atlantic alliance. The more China rises, the wider will be the spread of its interests.

　　“分而治之”的战略表明，中国有意识地希望利用欧洲目前的衰弱捞取好处，同时削弱大西洋联盟。随着中国一步步崛起，其利益范围也会越来越广。

　　How wide? China is not bidding to fill the role of global hegemon recently vacated by the US. There are too many natural constraints on its power – think geography, India and Japan as well as the US. Beyond that, we do not really know. But then nor, I suspect, does China.

　　中国的利益范围到底会有多广？中国并不打算接手美国不久前空出的全球霸主地位。中国的力量受到太多天然的限制——想一想它的地缘、印度、日本和美国吧。除此之外，我们也说不好到底会怎样，不过，我怀疑中国自己也不清楚。