In his new book, “Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance,” scheduled to be published in September, Peterson Institute for International Economics scholar Arvind Subramanian starts with a nightmare scenario: It's 2021 and the U.S. president heads across town to the International Monetary Fund to sign a rescue loan package negotiated by the IMF's Chinese managing director. “The handover of world dominance is complete,” Mr. Subramanian, a former IMF researcher, writes. China is now the world's leading economic power.

　　彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)学者阿文德•萨博拉曼尼亚(Arvind Subramanian)在他将于今年9月出版的新书《黯然失色：生活在中国经济主导地位的阴影下》(Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance)中，以这样一个噩梦般的场景开篇：2021年的某一天，美国总统跑去距离白宫不远的国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)，签署一份与该组织的中国籍总裁商讨达成的救助贷款一揽子协议。曾任IMF研究员的萨博拉曼尼亚写道，“世界主导权的交接已经完成。”如今的中国已是一个在全球处于领先地位的经济大国。

　　Parts of “Eclipse' read like a wonky version of 'Rising Sun,” Michael Crichton's 1992 novel of Japanese dominance over the U.S. when Tokyo was seen as speeding toward number one. But Mr. Subramanian is a first-class economist who uses his book to discuss provocatively U.S.-Chinese relations and the nature of economic power. He was interviewed in Washington DC by the Wall Street Journal's Bob Davis.

　　Below is an edited transcript Reuters这本书的部分篇章读起来和迈克尔•克莱顿(Michael Crichton)的小说《升起的太阳》(Rising Sun)有些像。后者是一部关于日本控制美国的小说，出版于1992年，那时的日本经济发展迅速，大有赶超美国成为全球第一的态势。不过萨博拉曼尼亚是一位优秀的经济学家，他写这本书是为了启发读者展开对于中美关系以及经济实力本质的讨论。《华尔街日报》记者鲍勃•戴维斯(Bob Davis)不久前在美国华盛顿特区对萨博拉曼尼亚进行了专访，以下是经过编辑的专访内容。

　　Do you really think the U.S. eventually will have to turn, hat-in-hand to the IMF for aid?

　　《华尔街日报》：你真的认为美国最终会不得不毕恭毕敬地向国际货币基金组织寻求援助吗？

　　I wrote it that way partly to shock and make people pay attention. But there is a real possibility of the U.S. being in such a dire economic situation that it might have to turn to the IMF.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：我这么写一部分原因是希望警醒世人，让人们关注这个问题。不过的确存在这种可能性，美国经济有可能陷入那种不得不需要向国际货币基金组织寻求援助的困境。

　　How could it happen? The combination of a credible rising power in China, with which we have to cooperate and also be wary of. And broad economic weakness in the U.S., including slow growth, fiscal weakness, political paralysis and a middle class with diminishing prospects.

　　怎么会发生这种事？一方面中国经济实力正在不容置疑地日渐强大，对此美国人既不得不予以配合，同时又不得不心存警惕。另一方面美国经济疲软之处却是处处皆是，包括经济增长速度缓慢、财政状况羸弱、政府无能、中产阶级的前途每况愈下。

　　The probability of U.S. needing an IMF loan isn't 80% but it's not 2% or 5% either. It's a 10% or 20% possibility.

　　美国需要国际货币基金组织提供贷款的可能性不会是80%那么高，但也不是2%或是5%。这件事发生的可能性有10%或20%。

　　By some of the measures you use, China already is a larger economy than the U.S. But haven't you picked economic statistics that play to China's advantage? For example relying on purchasing power parity to measure GDP. (Purchasing power parity, or PPP, is a statistical device that tries to take account of the different prices of goods and services in different countries.)

　　《华尔街日报》：按照一些你使用的标准衡量，中国的经济实力已经超越美国了。不过，你所挑选的是不是那些对中国有利的经济指标呢？比如说，依靠购买力平价来衡量国内生产总值(GDP)。（购买力平价(Purchasing Power Parity, 简称PPP)，是一种试图将不同国家的不同商品和服务价格纳入同一考量范畴的统计工具。）

　　PPP is an important concept, but it has a small weight in my overall formula of economic power.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：购买力平价是个重要的概念，不过在我对经济实力的整套评估系统中所占权重很小。

　　I believe that the resources a country brings to the power table includes resources that are internationally traded and resources that involve people. If the U.S. were to fight against China and 100 Chinese soldiers faced 100 US soldiers, would you say that because the 100 Chinese soldiers earn/20th of what an American soldier earns that the value of a Chinese soldier is 1/20th the value of American? I don't think so. (PPP tries to account for such anomalies.)

　　我认为，为一个国家带来经济实力的资源包括那些能在全球交易的资源，也包括与人相关的资源。假设美国将与中国交战，这时有100名中国士兵与100名美国士兵交火，你能说因为那100名中国士兵挣的钱只是美国士兵的二十分之一，所以一名中国士兵的价值只是一名美国士兵的二十分之一吗？我可不这么认为。（而购买力平价理论则证明上述反常理的说法成立。）

　　You also say that China will be a far larger economic power than the U.S. by 2020 or certainly 2030, even if China's growth rate falls significantly or the U.S's rises significantly. Why is that?

　　《华尔街日报》：你还提到，即使中国经济增速大幅减慢或是美国的经济增速明显加快，到2020年，或者最迟到2030年，中国的经济实力将远远超过美国。为什么这么说呢？

　　The way economic convergence between the U.S. and China is evolving, the fact that China will catch up is inevitable. At end of 20 years, China will have a GDP per capita of only 40-50% of the U.S. But China has four times the population of the U.S., so the Chinese economy will be much larger overall. The arithmetic is undeniable.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：中美两国之间的经济差距正在缩小，而中国最终将会迎头赶上也是无可争辩的事实。20年后，中国的人均GDP将只有美国的40-50%，不过中国的人口数量是美国的四倍，因此中国经济总量将比美国大得多。这个数字上的差异是不容置疑的。

　　China will have an economic crisis over the next 20 years, no doubt. But it will recover and return to some decent level of growth.

　　中国未来20年将会有一场经济危机，这一点毫无疑问。不过中国将会走出危机，恢复到一个不错的增长水平。

　　If China has a big economic shock, it has the policy space [including the ability to broadly stimulate the economy] to prevent one or two years of negative growth from translating into many years of slow growth.

　　即便中国出现严重的经济动荡，它也拥有足够的政策空间（包括广泛刺激经济的能力）来防止一两年的经济负增长演变成多年的低速增长。

　　What's the significance of China as number one?

　　《华尔街日报》：中国成为全球第一意味着什么呢？

　　Potentially, China has the ability to exercise its power in slightly unbenign ways. Look at what's happening today on exchange rate. [By keeping its currency undervalued] China is pursuing a beggar they- neighbor policy and nobody can stop them. That's sign of dominance.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：存在这种可能性，中国将有能力以不那么友善的方式利用其实力。看看今天在汇率问题上都发生了些什么。（中国将汇率维持在低估水平）中国采取以邻为壑的经济政策，而没有人能够阻止他们。这是占据主导地位的一种表现。

　　The U.S. is totally powerless to stop China because U.S. companies have so much at stake in China that China can call the shots. Asia won't do it because Asian economies are part of a value-added chain with China. Africa won't do it because China has made so much investment there..

　　美国完全没有能力阻止中国，因为美国企业对中国的依赖太多，中国掌握着主动权。亚洲国家不会去阻止中国，因为亚洲经济体是中国利益链条中的一部分。非洲国家也不会阻止中国，因为中国在那里有那么多的投资。

　　Imagine what happens when the numbers [denoting the size of the economy] diverge even more between China and the U.S.

　　想象一下如果中美之间的数字（指经济规模）差距进一步扩大会发生什么。

　　Still, China would be a relatively poor country compared to the U.S. How can a poor country exercise power internationally?

　　《华尔街日报》：尽管如此，相对美国而言，中国仍将是一个相对贫穷的国家。一个穷国怎么能在全球发挥其经济实力的威力呢？

　　Very poor countries can't dominate. There's now no way to project power abroad because the problems at home are so deep. But so-called middle income countries like China may be different. 萨博拉曼尼亚：非常贫穷的国家无法主导全球。由于本身的问题还很严重，穷国无法去国外耀武扬威。不过像中国这样的所谓中等收入国家可能就不同了。

　　There are different kinds of dominance. There is dominance of the U.S. a leader that's democratic and pursues international values and which inspires followship. Maybe China won't have that. But it could exercise a negative form of dominance, either through its exchange rate policy or by buying up commodities [to corner markets].

　　主导全球经济有不同的方式。如今美国作为全球主导，是个民主的领袖，追求国际价值，能够吸引他国的追随。中国可能不会如此。它有可能会采取一种消极的主导方式，通过其汇率政策或是大举买进商品（以垄断市场）。

　　WSJ: What's the biggest threat to China's rise to economic dominance? 《华尔街日报》：阻碍中国崛起成为全球经济领袖的最大威胁是什么？

　　A political shock to system. Then all bets are off.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：政治体系出现动荡。一旦如此，一切都是徒劳。

　　A political transition [to a more democratic system] hasn't occurred. It's a cloud that hangs over everything. There's class divide, geographic divide, lack of political freedom. If they wind up in conflagration, things could go really bad.

　　政权（向更为民主体系的）变更尚未出现，这是悬在一切之上的阴云。中国阶级分化明显，地域差距严重，政治又缺乏自由。如果这些矛盾激化爆发，事态将十分严重。

　　In your book, you talk about the importance of tethering China to a multilateral system. Why should China be interested if it's inevitably number one?

　　《华尔街日报》：你在书中谈到将中国纳入一个多边体系的重要性？如果势将成为全球领袖，中国为何要对此感兴趣呢？

　　We need to bind China today to the multilateral system so a kind of habit and incentive builds up. Then repudiation of the system would be more difficult. We need to do this before China becomes a hegemon.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：我们需要在今天就将中国与多边体系联系在一起，这样一来习惯和动力就形成了，日后要抛开这个体系就会比较困难。我们需要在中国成为霸主之前做这件事。

　　Everyone has to come together to do this well. If every country tries to make its own deal with China, no one will have any leverage.

　　要做好这件事，所有人都要团结起来。如果每个国家都试图私下和中国做交易，那么就没有一个国家能有任何影响力了。

　　Think about exchange rates. If the world came together now and said let's do a deal on exchange rates, China would be more likely to participate. It doesn't want to be seen as deviant from international system. The opprobrium of the world is the biggest carrot and stick to use with China.

　　想想汇率问题。如果现在全世界团结起来说，我们做一笔汇率交易吧，那么中国参与其中的可能性才会更大些。中国不愿意被视作远离多边体系的异类。世界各国的指责是对付中国最有用的胡萝卜加大棒。

　　One of your main policy recommendations is to start a China round of trade negotiations. What could that accomplish? 《华尔街日报》：你的一个主要政策建议是开始和中国进行一轮贸易谈判。这将如何完成呢？

　　When China joined World Trade Organization in 2001, people said we tied China to the global economic system (because of the commitments it made to open its markets and follow international rules). But through its exchange rate policy, China has unraveled parts of its commitments. What that signifies is that Chinese leaders at the time were overreaching in terms of domestic political support. Evidently, WTO accession wasn't politically sustainable internally.

　　萨博拉曼尼亚：当2001年中国加入世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization, 简称WTO)时，人们说我们将中国纳入到了全球经济系统中来了（因为中国加入WTO时承诺要开放市场并遵循国际准则）。然而通过其汇率政策，中国避开了部分承诺的束缚。这说明，从国内政治支持的角度来说，当时的中国领导人有点求之过急了。很显然，中国国内的政治情况不容许入世承诺一一兑现。

　　Over time, China will move away from mercantilism. They would then have an incentive to make a deal. A deal could involve government procurement other countries opening their bidding for China─as well as commitments by China involving control of natural resources and the exchange rate.

　　长期而言，中国终将会脱离重商主义。那时中国将有动力来与别国做交易，包括政府采购……中国也会做出有关自然资源控制权和汇率问题的承诺。